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Abstract
The objective of this paper is twofold: firstly, it analyzes the evolution of frauds in
the Italian wine value chain over the period 2007–2015, and then, using a properly
disaggregated social accounting matrix (SAM) of the Italian economy, it simulates
the impact of wine frauds on the national economy in terms of growth, employment,
value added and income. The wine industry is the sector most exposed to frauds
within the Italian agro-food system accounting for 88% of total value of seized agro-
food outputs. Most irregularities (95%) are made by only three agents, specifically
individual wineries, bottlers-wholesalers and retailers. We estimated industry-specific
SAM multipliers to assess the share of the Italian economy depending on irregular
wine production. These activities account for 11.5% of specialized permanent crop
farms output and over 25% of wine industry output. This is a sign of vulnerability
of the wine industry: should a food scandal/scare determine a drop in consumers’
demand, the negative effect on production activities of these sectors may be large. The
SAMwas also used to perform an impact analysis adopting a counterfactual approach.
Results show a slightly positive increase of value added (6 million euro) along with
an overall decrease in the activity level (an output loss of 406 million euro and more
than six thousand full time jobs lost). This contractionary effect can be explained with
fraud rents. Indeed, the extra-profits from frauds do not activate the economy circular
flow as most of them leak out to exogenous accounts such as the public administration
and the rest of the world.
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1 Introduction
The Italian agri-food system is one of the most important components of the “Made
in Italy”. In 2018, the agricultural sector produced outputs valued 55.9 billion euro,
employing 1.2 million labor units and exporting some 6.8 billion euro of agricultural
goods (ISTAT 2019a, b; ISMEA 2019a), while the food industry turnover peaked
at 140 billion euro, with 385 thousand employees and export exceeding 35.1 billion
euro, which ranks food as the second Italian largest exporting sector in 2018 (ISMEA
2019a; Federalimentare 2019a). In Italy the wine sector is the third most important
agri-food sector after dairy and meat in terms of production with an industrial turnover
exceeding 13.2 billion euro and more than 13 thousand employees in the wine indus-
try, but it is the most important agri-food exporting sector accounting for 6.2 billion
euro in 2018, i.e. 14.8% of total agri-food export, mostly represented by high-quality
wines with geographical indication (ISMEA 2019b).1 In fact, Italy ranks first at world
level in terms of number of geographically denominated wines, with 408 Protected
Designation of Origin (DOP) and 118 Protected Geographical Indications (IGP) wines
(FEDERDOC2019),2 accounting for 58.2% ofwine production and for an astonishing
88.2% of wine export in 2018.
The large share of high-quality wine produced by the Italian wine industry, the
increasing reputation of Italian wines on domestic and foreign markets that fetch sig-
nificant price premiums, and the large number of small production units contribute to
create significant opportunities for fraud—that is “an intentional illegal act made for
sake of economic gain” (Spink and Moyer 2011)3—in the wine industry. In fact, wine
ranks first by far among agri-food value chains in terms of number of detected irreg-
ularities and value of seized products (ICQRF 2019). However, though food frauds
have recently drawn considerable attention because of the growing risk of food fraud
(Avery 2014),4 frauds in the wine value chain is a neglected topic. Besides the yearly
reports of inspection bodies, which disseminate information about monitoring activ-
ities, the literature on the topic is scanty (INEA 2011; Menghini and Fabbri 2013).
Importantly, there is a fundamental gap in the economic literature in so far no com-
prehensive analysis of frauds in the wine sector in Italy has been carried out so far and
specifically no quantitative assessment of the economic impact of wine frauds on the
Italian economy.
1 Italy is one of the top players of the wine sector at world level ranking first in terms of production, second
in terms of export (both in volume and value) and third in terms of consumption (ISMEA 2019b).
2 The Legislative Decree n. 61/2010 unified the classification of all food products that have designation
of origin, including wines, into two major categories, namely: the DOP (Protected Designation of Origin)
products, which includes the existing wine’s DOC (Controlled Designation of Origin) and DOCG (Guaran-
teed and Controlled Designation of Origin), and the IGP (Protected Geographical Indication), which also
includes the already existing IGT (Typical Geographical Indication).
3 In mere descriptive terms, food frauds encompass alteration, adulteration, sophistication, and falsification
of agri-food products including the falsification of their trademarks (i.e., counterfeiting). However, in this
paper we adopt the definition above, which emphasizes the intentionality of the action done for the sake of
economic gain, and may or may not cause harm (Spink et al. 2013; Manning and Soon 2016).
4 This is true for Italy as well, where the agri-food sector is the third most affected sector by counterfeiting
after clothing and audio-visual, CD & DVD (CENSIS 2012).
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The overall objective of this paper is to shed light on the phenomenon of frauds in
the wine sector adopting a value chain perspective, that is analyzing grape production
as well as wine-making and distribution up to final consumption. This will be done
using as primary source the data on inspection activities carried out by the Central
Inspectorate for Agri-food Quality Protection and Fraud Repression (Ispettorato Cen-
trale per la Qualità e la Repressione delle Frodi, ICQRF) of the Italian Ministry of
Agriculture (MIPAAF). Specifically, we will (i) analyze the evolution of the fraud in
the wine value chain over the period 2007–2015, (ii) provide some insights on how
the phenomenon is distributed by geographical location and value chain stages, and
(iii) assess the economic importance of frauds, estimating how large is the irregular
economy linked to fraudulent activities in the wine value chain and what is its impact
on the Italian economy in terms of output, value added, employment and household
income. The impact analysis will be pursued building a properly disaggregated social
accounting matrix (SAM) of the Italian economy to simulate the effect of fraudulent
activities perpetrated by the operators along the wine value chain. In fact, the database
provided by ICQRF refers only to fraudulent activities carried out within the country.
Because of this lack of data, fraudulent activities such as the import of counterfeited
agri-food products or the so-called “Italian sounding” are not accounted for in the
analysis.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes how the wine value
chain is structured in Italy. Section 3 summarizes the most common frauds in the wine
value chain. Section 4 briefly recalls what is a SAM and proposes a methodology to
carry out an impact evaluation of food frauds in a SAM counterfactual framework.
Section 5 explains how the SAM of the Italian economy and the vector of wine fraud
shocks has beenbuilt. Section6discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section7
concludes.
2 The ItalianWine Value Chain
The Italian wine value chain is made by a complex cobweb of material and financial
flows connecting vineyards to final consumption. Leaving aside the exchange with
foreign markets, involving import of bulk wines accounting for no more than 5% of
total domestic wine availability and export of bulk and bottled wine accounting for
42% of total domestic wine production (ISMEA 2019b), the wine value chain can be
broken down into four main stages (Fig. 1) that are: the production of raw material
(grape producing farms), wine-making (wineries), packaging and logistics (bottling,
transport, storage firms) and distribution to final consumers, represented by channels
as different as the large modern distribution, retailers and the hotel-restaurants and
catering (Ho.Re.Ca.) channel. Besides the agents involved in production, processing,
5 Italian sounding is a phenomenon encompassing the commercialization abroad of food products packaged
using labels, symbols, pictures, etc. that resemble originally produced Italian goods. Although an accurate
assessment of this phenomenon is yet to come, rough estimates show that the value of Italian sounding
products is as high as 90 billion euro in 2018, that is 64%of the legal food industry turnover (Federalimentare
2019b). However, it is likely that the impact of the Italian sounding on a product such wine is less important
than for other food products such as cheese and olive oil (Federalimentare 2016).
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Fig. 1 Structure of the Italian wine value chain. Source: elaboration based on Malorgio et al. (2011) and
ISMEA (2019b)
packaging and distribution, there are other categories of agents involved in services
associated with production, such as nurseries, wine yeast producers, oenotechnics,
and marketing such as exporters, importers, certification agencies, communication
agencies, who play an increasingly important role.
In terms of fraud risk the most important stages are the first three, i.e. grape produc-
tion, processing, and packaging. The three most important operators in these stages
are grape producers, wine-makers and bottlers. According to the latest available data
(Malorgio et al. 2011; Mazzarino and Corsi 2014; MIPAAF 2017; ISMEA 2019b),
these three categories total around 320 thousand operators (Table 1). The vast majority
of them (310 thousands) are grape producers who can in turn be broken down into
individual farmers, representing 54% of total farmers involved in the value chain and
accounting for 52% of the grapes produced in Italy, and farmers who are members
of a wine-making cooperative, accounting for 46% of total grape producers and con-
tributing with a share of 48% to total domestic production of grapes for wine-making
(Mazzarino and Corsi 2014). The grape supply is highly fragmented, with a myriad
of small farms averaging only 2.1 hectare each (ISMEA 2019b). Only farms whose
owners are cooperative members feature some aggregation of their individual supply
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Table 1 Major actors in the Italian wine value chain, 2018
Actors Number Share of output (%)
Farmers (grape producers) Individual farmers 168,719 52
Cooperative membersa 141,709 48
Total farmers 310,428 100
Wineries (processing) Farm wineriesb 42,000 21
Industrial wineries 1807 29
Cooperative wineries 518 50
Total wineries 44,325 100
Bottlers (packaging) Pure bottlers 1600 20
Integrated bottlers 6400 80
Total bottlers 8000 100
Grand totalc 320,753




cThe grand total accounts for 42,000 farmers who are also wine-makers
providing their whole production to the coop winery they belong to.6 However, also
in this case, the farming size is generally small (MIPAAF 2017).
The processing phase accounts for 44 thousand wineries. Most of them (42
thousand) are small farm wineries accounting for one fifth of total domestic wine
production. Usually farm wineries are integrated with grape farms that process their
own grapes, supplemented sometimes with purchased grapes. In order to be economi-
cally viable, many small wineries integrate functions other than wine-making such as
direct sale. Similarly, rather than bottling their own wine, these small wineries usually
resort to mobile and/or fixed bottling plants, which quite frequently can also provide
trading services (mostly at wholesale stage). An important segment of the processing
stage is represented by coop wineries. These wineries process the grapes provided by
cooperative members but may also integrate their own provision of raw material by
purchasing grapes from individual farmers through the spot market. Although coop
wineries total only 518 cooperatives, they account for one half of total domestic wine
production. The remaining share of domestic wine production (29%) is produced by
industrial wineries.
Packaging is the most concentrated stage within the value chain, primarily because
of the costly investment required to establish bottling lines. Bottlers account for
roughly 8000 operators, made almost exclusively by industrial and cooperative winer-
ies, plus a small proportion of farm wineries (Malorgio et al. 2011), that integrate
wine-making with bottling. Bottling operators are quite heterogeneous in terms of
vertical integration along the wine value chain: roughly one fifth of them being purely
6 Two coop farms out of three are contractually committed to provide their own whole grape crop to the
coop processing plant, and a non-trivial share of cooperatives (23%) regulates their raw material provision
according to provision plans the coop farmers have to comply with (MIPAAF 2017).
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Fig. 2 Wineries’ orientation in terms of product quality characteristics. Source: elaboration on data from
Malorgio et al. (2011)
bottlers, while the rest integrating functions other than bottling, such as grape pro-
cessing into wine. According to Mazzarino and Corsi (2014), bottlers are increasingly
providing also wholesale services. The bottlers-wholesalers perform a double func-
tion: from one hand, they connect wine producers to the stage of final distribution; on
the other hand, they are responsible of transportation and/or storage ofwine sometimes
going downstream up to final sale, which may include also exports.
From the structural viewpoint, the Italian wine value chain is characterized by high
fragmentation of involved farms/firms. At the same time the value chain is increasingly
concentrated moving from production to processing and packaging. In terms of con-
duct, the wine-making units, whether integrated or not, show different orientation in
terms of quality characteristics of their output (Fig. 2). Farm and cooperative wineries
are more specialized in high-quality wines such as DOP and IGP wines, while most
of industrial wineries (68%) produce only conventional wine.
3 Frauds in the ItalianWine Value Chain
3.1 Types of Frauds
Although food fraud is a hot topic in politically debates and news headlines, frauds in
the Italian wine value chain have not attracted the scholarly interest so far. To the best
of our knowledge, there are only a couple of studies dealing with this issue. INEA
(2011) published a report analyzing the wine, olive oil and dairy value chains in order
to support ICQRF activity planning. However, the report relies only on a qualitative
analysis of secondary data and expert judgments to draw some suggestions on how
ICQRF monitoring activities could be improved. Menghini and Fabbri (2013) edited
a report on the traceability in the wine value chain that analyzes the organization of
monitoring activities in the value chain. However, this study is mostly a discussion
of current practices rather than a comprehensive analysis of the issues at stake. It
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emphasizes the key role of the inspection systems for the wellbeing of consumers as
well as producers (Iaderosa 2013) and the need to protect primarily DOP and IGP
wines (Fabbri 2013; Rosellini and Fabbri 2013).
Experts and operators within the value chain acknowledge that frauds are pervasive,
highly differentiated and perpetrated at different stages of the value chain. Indeed, over
the last decades several factors have contributed to expand the determinants of the so-
called “fraud triangle” model originally proposed by Cressey (1953),7 thus providing
increased room for fraudulent activities. We refer to factors as diverse as the increased
competition in domestic and world markets, the increased complexity of globalized
value chains, the high level of sophistication of many production processes, and the
global recession and its aftermaths. As a result, the share of irregular product and
the value of seizures in the wine value chain have been increasing over the last years
(Rocchi et al. 2020).
Both experts and statistical evidence show that the most important frauds in the
value chain involve (i) sophistication such as sugar/alcohol addition, flavoring, use
of wine processing by-products such as the wine dregs, use of grapes other than the
grapes declared in the label, etc., and (ii) partial or total falsification of DOP and IGP
wines through not-compliance with production codes, incorrect DOP/IGP labeling,
incorrect administrative rules on process documentation and quality certification, etc.
(ICQRF 2019).While the first group includes practices that can be potentially harmful
to human health, the second category is generally much less harmful but has generally
greater economic impact (INEA 2011). In terms of agents of frauds, the first category
is generally confined to the agents involved in the processing phase (i.e. wine-makers),
while the second category is spread throughout the value chain. Since the opportunity to
make fraud depends on the level of commercialization of the relevant agents, it is likely
that the second group of frauds is more concentrated with agents that perform bottling
and distribution of wines, especially exporting firms, to take the highest advantage
from the reputation of Italian wines abroad (De Franceschi 2016). Actually, most
frauds in the wine supply chain are a combination of these two forms of fraudulent
behavior.
3.2 Irregularities and Seizures Along theValue Chain
For the purpose of the analysis to be carried out in this study, a food fraud exists
whenever an ICQRF inspected product features any kind of irregularity no matter if
it leads to the product seizure or to other administrative penalties such as fines and
warnings.8 Any product featuring alteration, adulteration, sophistication or falsifica-
7 The fraud triangle includes three elements: opportunity, motivation and rationalization. The first element
refers to the ability to commit the fraud as fraudsters do not wish to be caught; the second element refers
to incentives, which come from a financial pressure or need felt by the potential fraudster; while the third
element involves the person in reconciling the fraudulent behavior with the commonly accepted notions of
trust. In other words, risks of fraud are more likely perpetrated by individuals who are in a position that
helps them to make fraud, coupled with feeling under pressure and having low moral standards (Cressey
1953).
8 Seizures refer to more serious infringements to the rules and norms (e.g. food adulteration that can have
harmful effects) than, for example, mere administrative non-compliance not leading to seizure. This carries
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tion is identified as “irregular product”, while the subset of irregular products that are
withdrawn from the market is identified as “seized product”.9 Finally, the agent that
commits fraud is called “irregular establishment”.
However, the ICQRF dataset only partially mirrors the structure of the wine value
chain as reported in Fig. 1 because of some limitations in the information provided.
On the one hand, it is impossible to single out industrial wineries and farm winer-
ies because no such information is available and no data are available on business
dimensions. Similarly, no information about the different typologies of retailing,
i.e. traditional retailers vs. modern distribution, is reported. Furthermore, because
of the integration of several functions at packaging stage, all establishments perform-
ing storage, transportation, wholesaling, and bottling have been considered under
bottlers-wholesalers. On the other hand, there are some firms providing services to
wine-making firms that are inspected and it is worth to keep them separate from other
actors. In short, we end up with a simplified structure of the wine value chain includ-
ing the following actors: individual wineries (farm as well as industrial), cooperative
wineries, bottlers-wholesalers, service providers, retailers, and Ho.Re.Ca.
Figure 3 shows how the ICQRF inspection activities have been distributed at differ-
ent stages of the value chain over the period 2007–2015. The distribution of inspections
reflects both the size of agents at different stages as well as the ICQRF expectations
about the likelihood of making frauds. In fact, about two thirds of inspections are
carried out at the level of processing. However, the bulk of these inspections targets
individual wineries, while inspected cooperative wineries account only for a trivial
0.6% of the total. Retailing come second as proportion of inspections with about one
fifth of total, and third come the bottlers-wholesalers with some 11% of total.
The highest share of irregularities is among individual wineries, accounting for
more than three quarter of total irregularities, a proportion that is noticeably higher
than that of inspections. This confirms the wine-processing phase as the most crit-
ical stage in terms of fraud opportunities (cf. Sect. 3.1). A share of irregularities
largely in line with the inspection rate (11.5% vs. 10.2%, respectively) applies also
to bottlers-wholesalers, with bottling and transportation showing a higher intensity
of irregularities as compared to storage and wholesaling. Retailing and Ho.Re.Ca.
show considerably lower shares of irregularities. Indeed, in most cases these agents
are not responsible for the irregularities detected at their level that are traced back to
the responsible agent upstream the value chain.
To shed light on the intensity of frauds along the value chain, we calculate various
indicators at different stages (Fig. 4). The ratio of irregular establishments to inspected
establishments is the highest among service providers (36%) whose number of inspec-
tions do not exceed on average 2% of total inspections. The ratio ranges between 22
and 26% among cooperative wineries, individual wineries and bottlers-wholesalers.
Retailers and Ho.Re.Ca. operators have both lower ratios (about 5%). The distribu-
tion in terms of seizure value mirrors that of irregularities with individual wineries,
bottlers-wholesalers and retailers accounting for almost total seizures.
Footnote 8 continued
important information for wine fraud analysis that we deem important to disclose to the interested reader.
Therefore, we perform the analysis for both seized and irregular products.
9 As a result, seized products represent a lower bound in the estimate of food fraud, while irregular products
detected by inspection activity represent its upper bound.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of inspected and irregular establishments: numbers and proportions (yearly averages)
4 Modelling the Impact of Wine Fraud in a SAM Framework
4.1 A Short Introduction to SAM
ASAM is a comprehensive and disaggregated representation of the transactionswithin
an economy in a matrix form. Each ‘sector’ of the economy (an industry, the market
for a given commodity, the current account of a given institution and so on) is repre-
sented by a row/column couple recording the relative flows. As in a double-keeping
accounting system the totals of inflows (row) and outflows (column) of each sector
must balance.
The SAM model is a natural extension of the Input–Output model originally pro-
posed by Leontief (1936) to analyze the technical interdependencies in the production
system. SAMs are the empirical ground base of a wide spectrum ofmulti-sector empir-
icalmodels (Round 2003) representing the structural interrelationships existing among
production, income distribution, final consumption and capital formation.
The core of a SAM model is the matrix of direct expenditure coefficients, B, that
is the matrix of coefficients obtained dividing each single entry of the SAM by the
corresponding column total. The size and the structure of the matrix B depends on the
disaggregation of accounts in the original SAM as well as on the adopted ‘closure’. As
usual for single-country models, we assume the small economy hypothesis, consider-
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Fig. 4 Irregular establishment intensity, seizure value per inspection (euro) and percentage of seizure value
on total seizure value along the wine value chain (yearly averages)
ing the Government and the exchanges with the rest of the world as exogenous. The
process of capital formation is also assumed as exogenous, as our research question
focuses on short-run (not dynamic) impacts. The resulting of matrix B, including all




0 A 0 F 0
S 0 0 0 0
0 V 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 C
0 0 D 0 T
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where S is the (n × m) industry by commodity matrix showing the share of each
commodity that is produced by each industry, A is the (m × n) matrix showing the
value of inputs of each commodity per dollar worth of industry output, V is the (v ×
n) matrix of coefficients of primary distribution of value added to production factors,
D is the (d × v) matrix of coefficients of primary income distribution from factors to
institutions,F is the (m× c)matrix of supplyof commodities to consumption functions,
C is the (c × d) matrix of final consumption expenditure coefficients of endogenous
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institutions,10 and T is the (d × d) matrix of coefficients representing transactions
among institutions. All other blocks are zero blocks of conformable dimensions.
A generic SAM linear model (Miller and Blair 2009) can be written in matrix form
as follows:
y  By + x (1)
where y is the vector of totals and x the vector of exogenous inflows towards endoge-
nous accounts.
The solution of the system (1) maps the vector x of exogenous components to the
vector y of totals of endogenous accounts through the matrix M of SAM multipliers:
y  (I − B)−1x  Mx (2)
where I is the identity matrix. Equation (2) shows that in SAM models the activation
of the economy linearly depends on the magnitude of a vector of exogenous inflows
towards endogenous accounts. This relationship holds also in difference:
dy  Mdx (3)
where dx is a vector of changes in exogenous injections, representing a given scenario
to be assessed. The entries of matrix M can be interpreted as Leontevian-Keneysian
multipliers, as the model is ‘closed’ towards consumptions and allows to account not
only for the multiplier effects generated by inter-industry linkages but also for the
additional impacts induced by income distribution and final expenditure. In this sense
SAM models provide a more comprehensive account of multiplier effect than the
input–output ones.11 Moreover, the inclusion of households as an endogenous sector
allows to model how the distributive structure of the economy is likely to affect the
impacts of exogenous shocks (Roland-Holst and Sancho 1992). These are the basic
motivations to use a SAM rather than an input–output framework for our analysis.
4.2 A SAM-Based Counterfactual Framework for the Analysis ofWine Fraud Impact
The simulations carried out to assess the impact of frauds in the wine value chain refer
to each of the two terms on the right-hand side in Eq. (3).
The first simulation uses the fraudulent wine output value, estimated according to
the data provided by ICQRF (both seizures and other irregular products), as a vector
of exogenous shocks, dx, to be injected into the model keeping M constant. We can
interpret the dependence of wine demand on irregular productions as a measure of the
vulnerability of the wine value chain to scandals/scares, especially considering that
the demand for quality wines is largely driven by reputation. In this case, the larger
10 In the proposed model endogenous institutions ad households (10 groups by income deciles), firms (2
groups) and non-profit institutions serving households.
11 Stone (1985) provides an additive decomposition of multipliers showing that SAM-based multipliers
encompass the corresponding input–output ones.
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the share of the final demand supplied by fraudulent products the higher the risk of a
system disruption.
The second simulation adopts a counterfactual approach. Based on the structure of
the interdependencieswithin the economy represented by thematrixM and using addi-
tional information from secondary sources and key informants, a new counterfactual
matrix of SAM multipliers,M*, representing the Italian economy as if there were no
frauds, can be derived. This makes possible to evaluate the impact of wine frauds, c, by
subtracting the level of activation that would be achieved should the farms/firms in the
wine value chain be fully-compliant (that is not making frauds) from the actual level
of activation of the Italian economy (as represented in the original SAM):
c  (M − M∗)x  y − y∗ (4)
where x is the vector of actual exogenous inflows towards all endogenous accounts,
y is the vector of totals of actual endogenous accounts, and y* is the vector of totals
of endogenous accounts that would be observed should the production system be
fully-compliant.
Developing a counterfactual in a SAM framework requires information on frauds
that are by definition difficult to be disclosed by interested agents. Alternatively, sector
experts and key informants could be approached to provide their best guess on the cost
structure of the most common frauds perpetrated in the wine value chain.12 This is the
procedure adopted in this study.
Formally the impact assessment can be summarized as follows. Let Af be the
(m × n) matrix of input coefficients of non-compliant (i.e. fraudulent) production
activities. The (n×1) vector f of total output of production activities is given by
the sum of the ff vector of non-compliant production total values and the fr vector
of compliant (i.e. regular) total output values. The use matrix Zf representing total
intermediate consumptions (commodity by industry use matrix) for non-compliant
production activities is computed via post-multiplication of diagonalized vector ff to
the matrix Af :
Z f  Af f̂f (5)
The use matrix for fully-compliant production activities can be obtained by the
difference:
Zr  Z − Z f (6)
whereZ is the usematrix in the original (i.e. actual) SAM.AmatrixAr, representing
the expenditure coefficients for a production system including only fully-compliant
production activities, can be estimated dividing the elements of Zr by the total value
of regular products:
Ar  Zr ̂(f − ff )−1 (7)
12 Cf. Section 6.2.1 for details on how the key informant estimates have been elicited.
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Matrix B*, representing the fully-compliant (i.e. counterfactual) economy, is
obtained substituting the modified matrix Ar for the corresponding sub-matrix of
direct input coefficients of production activities included in matrix B as resulting from
the original SAM (i.e. based on actual data).
5 The Building Blocks of Wine Fraud Simulations on the Italian
Economy
5.1 Building a SAM of the Italian Economy for FoodValue Chain Analysis
Modelling the impact of wine fraud requires a SAM of the Italian economy appropri-
ately disaggregated to single out the wine value chain as well as other relevant sector
of the agri-food system. The input–output (I–O) table of the Italian economy for
year 2009 estimated by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT 2016), which includes
accounts for 63 industries and for the corresponding products. However, in this table
agriculture and food industry are represented by only one production account each
and the corresponding two commodities, i.e. agricultural products and food products.
Therefore, the agricultural sector was disaggregated to represent 8 different farming
typologies according to the classification adopted at theEuropean levelwithin the Farm
Accountancy Data Network (EU Regulation 2003/369), including the group of farms
specialized in permanent crops such as vineyards. The account representing the Food
Industry was disaggregated into 10 different of food processing activities, including
wine-making, producing the corresponding 10 commodities, including wine.13 The
disaggregation is fully consistent with the accounting rules defined within the Euro-
pean System of Accounts (Eurostat 2008). After the disaggregation the input–output
table included 80 industries producing the corresponding 80 products.14
We then merged the disaggregated I–O supply and use tables with the SAM of the
Italian economy estimated by the Tuscany Regional Institute for Economic Planning
with reference to the same year (IRPET 2016). In fact, the original IRPET’s SAM
included a supply and use table based on the ISTAT 2009 table. The classification
of industries and commodities in the IRPET table was fully consistent with that of
the ISTAT table, though more aggregated (37 industries producing 54 commodities).
Therefore, the inclusion of the disaggregated supply and use table in the IRPET’s SAM
was quite straightforward. Accounts for the other industries and commodities were re-
aggregated where necessary to harmonize with the classification adopted in the IRPET
matrix. The new accounts for agriculture and food industry sub-sectors were balanced
adjusting the value of depreciation in the disaggregation of value added, while the
accounts for new food commodities were balanced adjusting variations in stocks. In
the IRPET SAM, institutions purchase bundles of goods and services corresponding to
23 final consumption functions. Agriculture and food subsectors sell their products to
13 The disaggregation of industries and commodities accounts was based on the same microeconomic data
used by ISTAT in the construction of the Input–Output table as well as on secondary data such as the Farm
Accounting Data System public database (EUCommission 2019), the ISMEA 2003 usematrix of the Italian
food system (ISMEA 2009) and the Eurostat structural business statistics database (Eurostat 2019).
14 Further details on the disaggregation procedures can be found in Rocchi et al. (2020).
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consumers throughout two functions (purchases of food and purchases of beverages).
Therefore, the disaggregation of final consumption according to the new classification
of commodities in the supply and use table was not necessary.
Eventually, the final SAM breakdown includes the following 183 accounts:
– 64 commodities,
– 54 industries,
– 12 accounts for primary income distribution,
– 23 final consumptions functions,
– 18 accounts for current income use by institutions (including 10 household groups
according to deciles of equivalent per capita available income and 8 Government
accounts),
– 9 accounts to represent capital formation, and
– 3 accounts for flows with the rest of the world.
5.2 Building theVector ofWine Fraud Shocks
An estimate of the monetary value of seized and irregular products is required to
assess the impact of wine frauds on the Italian economy through SAM simulations.
Specifically, an estimate of the monetary value of fraudulent wine at final consump-
tion is needed as simulations are modeled as exogenous shocks on the final demand
(cf. Sect. 4.1). Therefore, food fraud data need to be transformed as if they referred
to products for final consumption, using proper technical coefficients to convert the
fraudulent quantities detected at specific stages of the value chain in final consumption
quantity equivalents. For example, if wine grapes are spotted as irregular, the quantity
of grapes needs to be transformed into wine equivalent quantities using the technical
conversion coefficients. Then the resulting quantities are multiplied by the consumer
price of wine in order to get an estimate of the monetary value of irregular wine at
final consumption.
ICQRF data shows there are three types of irregular/seized products: grapes, musts,
andwines.We refer to technical data from the literature (Ribéreau-Gayonet et al. 2017)
as well as Italian experts’ judgments to retrieve realistic technical coefficients of con-
version to transform the intermediate product quantities into final product equivalents,
as follows: grapes tomust: 0.70 kg/l;must towine: 0.88; and grapes towine: 0.616 kg/l.
In order to estimate an average representative price at final consumption we use
the ICQRF dataset (ICQRF 2016) that includes detailed information on quantities and
values of seized products at various levels of the value chain. The price is calculated as
a weighted average of the quantities seized from production units that sell directly to
consumers. However, since seizures have been enforced in different years, we deflate
their values using the consumer price index with the base year 2009 (ISTAT 2016),
that is the reference year of our SAM. The resulting average price to final consumption
is 2.02 euro per liter of wine, expressed in euro 2009.
In order to make SAM simulations we need both value of seized and irregular wine,
which represent a lower and upper bound of frauds, respectively. However, while in
the case of seized products the ICQRF database reports both quantities and values,
in the case of irregular products the database reports only quantities. Therefore, the
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estimation procedures to compute the final consumption equivalents of the two figures
are different. In the case of seized product, in order to get a monetary estimate, it
is good enough to multiply the quantity equivalent at final consumption of seized
musts and grapes as well as wines times the average consumer price of wine: this will
yield the sample-level estimates of the yearly average seizures. In the case of irregular
products, we adopt a two-step procedure: first we calculate the ratios of the number of
seized products to the irregular products from the ICQRF database, which averaged at
17.8% over the entire period of 2007–2015 for wine value chain, and then we divide
the value of seized products by this rate to yield the value of irregular products at the
sample level.15
The last step before getting the figures to be used in the SAM simulations is to
expand these sample-level estimates to the population-level. In doing this, we use the
ratio of the inspected establishments (sample) to the number of active establishment
(population) as they result from the last Census on industry, commerce and services
(ISTAT 2014).16 The resulting sampling ratio is 8.3%. On average, if all establish-
ments were inspected (and if all assumptions above would hold), the value of seizures
expanded to the national population would be 470.7 million euro, while the value of
irregular products would be 3,115.6 million euro, both values expressed in euro 2009.
In SAM simulations we use these two estimates as lower and upper bounds of frauds
in the wine supply chain, respectively.
6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Vulnerability of the Italian Economy toWine Frauds
According to the social accounting matrix in 2009 the domestic food supply chain
produced wine for a total value of 11.3 billion euro. Wine was supplied by production
activities of different size and nature that could be classified into different industries
within the SAM. The total value of output is shared between production activities
classified under agriculture (47%)—mostly small-medium specialized permanent crop
farms carrying out the whole production process from the vineyard to the marketing
of bottled wine (43%) and other farms (4%)—and the wine industry (50%). Other
manufacturing and service activities, including the other sectors of food industry,
account for a tiny share of total output (about 3%).
The average annual values of seized and irregular wine have been allocated among
the different activities producing wine in the SAM, according to their own shares in
total production of wine. The resulting vectors have been used as exogenous shocks
in the SAM model to estimate the share of the Italian economy activated by the
final demand for seized and irregular wine products. The estimated figures are not
trivial. Even in the more conservative estimate, i.e. considering only seizures, the
15 This procedure rests on the implicit assumption that the composition of seizures is representative of the
whole set of irregular products, which is indeed the case.
16 This implies the assumption that controls are random and the probability to find irregularities in the
entire population is equal of probability to find them in companies subject to controls. We thank one of the
anonymous referees for emphasizing this point.
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Table 2 Share of total economy
activated by the final demand for
irregular wine (euro 2009)
Seized wine Irregular wine
Value of irregular wine (M
euro)
471 3116
Share of total output (M euro) 1390 0.05% 9197 0.31%
Share of total employment
(000 labor unit)
17,338 0.07% 114,749 0.47%
Share of value added (M euro) 613 0.05% 4060 0.30%
Share of households’ gross
income (M euro)
499 0.03% 3305 0.19%
Table 3 Share of output value
and employment activated by
demand for irregular wine across
agri-food sectors
Output (%) Labor units
Specialized permanent crop farms 11.51 55,855
Other farms 1.46 11,225
Wine industry 25.63 4599
Other activities 0.20 43,069
fraudulent wine activities generate over 17 thousand labor units. Assuming that all
irregular products were demanded by consumers, the share of total economy activated
by irregular wine production would represent 0.31% of total output and almost 0.5%
of total employment, that is almost 115 thousand full time labor units (Table 2).
The estimates are far more impressive when looking at the agri-food system break-
down (Table 3). Up to 11.5% of the output of specialized permanent crop farms
and over 25% of wine industry would directly and/or indirectly depend on the final
demand for irregular product. Should a food scandal/scare determine a drop in con-
sumers’ demand, the negative effect on production activities of these sectors may be
large. This is extremely important for the Italian wine sector, a value chain where
quality differentiation through immaterial attribute, primarily geographical origin of
products, is at the core of its competitive advantages within the global markets. The
potential negative impact is substantial, both within and outside the wine sector.
6.2 Impact ofWine Frauds on the Italian Economy
6.2.1 Structure of Costs
In order to build a counterfactual SAM representing a hypothetical fully-compliant
wine sector, we estimated the Af matrix (cf. Sect. 4.2) using information provided
by a panel of 15 key informants who are experts in the wine value chain organiza-
tion across the country, playing leading roles within control bodies (ICQRF and the
Agro-food Unit of the Italian Forest Service), research institutions (Council for Agri-
cultural Research and Analysis of Agricultural Economics), producers associations
(wine consortia), and freelance professionals specialized in the wine industry.
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Agricultural products 18.30 9.10 3.70




Chemical products 3.10 3.10 0.60
Non-metallic minerals 2.50 2.50 0.50








Wages 8.10 8.10 1.60
Profits 8.30 23.20 74.00
The key informants were asked to provide information aiming at: (i) modifying the
wine average cost structures as reported in the original SAM (i.e. the cost structure
including both regular and irregular wine production activities) to better represent the
activities of different production units, and (ii) identifying the vector of costs repre-
senting the cost structure of an average non-compliant production unit according to
the most common frauds in the wine value chain.17 Table 4 reports the results of this
exercise, including the vector of direct expenditure coefficients for thewine industry as
in the original SAM (first column) and those of the two most common frauds (last two
columns), namely wine produced adopting irregular wine-making practices (such as
the use of wood chips to provide flavors to young wine) and commercialization prac-
tices not complying with administrative rules on process documentation and quality
certification.
We assume these coefficients are representative of the average structure of costs
in wine production irrespective of the winery type, e.g. farm wineries vs. industrial
17 The elicitation of expert estimates entails the following steps: a) qualitatively describe the most frequent
frauds in the production of wine; b) modify the wine average cost structures (i.e. the SAM cost structures) to
better represent the production activities of different production units; c) further modify the vector of costs
to better represent cost structure of an average non-compliant production unit. The expert estimates were
averaged and the resulting vectors were sent them back for a double check before being used in building
the counterfactual scenario. A sensitivity analysis was carried out replicating the counterfactual analysis
according to different hypotheses on the structure of costs in irregular activities, respectively halving (“best”
case) and doubling (“worst” case) the output to intermediate costs ratio, relative to the “reference” estimate
based on the expert estimates, yielding a modest variation in the estimated impact (cf. Rocchi et al. (2020)
for further details).
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Table 5 Aggregate impact of wine frauds on the Italian economy (euro 2009)
Impact on Seized wine Irregular wine
Absolute value % impact Absolute value % impact
Total output (M euro) − 10,588 0.000 − 405,802 − 0.014
Total employment (labor units) − 359 − 0.001 − 5723 − 0.024
Value added (M euro) 2399 0.000 5534 0.000
Households’ gross income (M euro) − 9352 − 0.001 − 119,331 − 0.007
and cooperative wineries. This assumption seems reasonable for two reasons. First, in
the disaggregation of production accounts to build the SAM (Rocchi et al. 2020) each
production unit is classified under a given industry according to a prevalence criterion
in production.18 Second, wine processing, like other bio-based activities carried out at
the farm level, is a processwith limited economies of scale. Even though the production
units belonging to the wine industry account (i.e. industrial and coop wineries) are
likely larger than those belonging to the specialized permanent crops account (i.e. farm
wineries), we can assume that the production cost structure is similar in both cases.
According to the experts most wine frauds are a combination of adopting irregular
wine-making practices and not complying with administrative rules. Therefore, in
calculating the matrix of multipliers for the counterfactual fraud-free wine sector, we
assumed a cost structure of fraudulent activities equal to the average of the last two
columns in Table 4.
6.2.2 Aggregate Economy-Wide Impact
The aggregate economic impacts of frauds in the wine value chain are summarized
in Table 5. The level of activation of the economy decreases irrespective to the size
frauds, i.e. assuming the value of the seized products only or the value of all irregular
products. The loss of total output in the Italian economy due to wine frauds ranges
between 11 and 406 million euro, causing an employment loss up to 6 thousand
labor units. The results show an added value increase (between 2 and 6 million euro)
along with an overall decrease in the economic activity level (losses in output and
employment). Such a result represents a situation where frauds give raise to rents
decreasing economic growth: the extra-profits from frauds are likely to not activate
the circular flow as savings and incomes leak out towards exogenous accounts such as
the public administration and the rest of the world. The potential loss in households’
income ranges between 9 and 119 million euro.
18 This is true for both the wine industry account—the supply matrix included in the SAM shows that also
these units supply a mix of different commodities, including agricultural products as well as other food
products—and the farmwineries included in the specialized permanent crops farm categories—that include
vineyard cultivation and other crops as well as wine-making.
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Table 6 Impact of wine frauds agri-food sectors (2009 euro; 000 labor units)
Agri-food sectors Seized wine Irregular wine
% Total output Labor units % Total output Labor units
Meat and production of meat products − 0.01 −3 − 0.05 − 28
Processing and preserving of fish,
crustaceans and molluscs
− 0.04 − 2 − 0.33 − 18
Production of olive oil − 0.02 − 1 − 0.15 − 5
Manufacture of other food products − 0.01 − 11 − 0.04 − 95
Manufacture of processed vegetables and
fruits products
0.00 0 − 0.04 − 11
Manufacture of dairy products − 0.02 − 11 − 0.17 − 85
Manufacture of grain mill products,
starches and starch products
− 0.03 − 2 − 0.19 − 18
Manufacture of prepared animal feed − 0.05 − 6 − 0.40 − 45
Production of wine − 0.08 − 15 − 0.69 − 142
Manufacture of other beverages − 0.01 − 3 − 0.09 − 27
Specialized field crops − 0.06 − 148 − 0.50 − 1305
Specialized permanent crops − 0.06 − 312 − 0.54 − 2845
Total agriculture − 0.06 − 709 − 0.51 − 6331
Total food industry − 0.02 − 55 − 0.13 − 475
6.2.3 Impact on the Agri-Food System
Themagnitude of impacts on agriculture and the food industry is larger than on the rest
of the economy. The agricultural output shrinks because of wine frauds up to 0.51%
while the output of the food industry would be reduced by 0.13% when consider-
ing irregular productions (Table 6). The impacts are differentiated among production
activities within the agro-food system, ranging from − 0.05% of output in the meat
industry to − 0.69% in the wine industry (estimates based on total irregular produc-
tion). Due to the strong linkages between vineyard cultivation and wine production
the impact on specialized permanent crop farms is significant (0.54% of their potential
output).
The largest loss of employment in absolute terms is recorded in agriculture (exceed-
ing 6 thousand labor units in the upper bound estimate), 45%ofwhich in the specialized
permanent crop farms. Interestingly, the total employment loss in the agri-food system
only is higher than the impact on employment in the whole economy (− 5723 full time
labor units, cf. Table 5). This implies that the net effect on employment in the non-food
economy is positive. Among sectors that benefit most from frauds are professional,
scientific and technical activities, including legal and administrative services. This is
a further element characterizing the rent effect generated by wine frauds.
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Fig. 5 Impact on households’ gross income (% values by income deciles)
6.2.4 Distribution impact on household income
Figure 5 shows the impact on household income distribution assuming a value of
frauds equal to that of irregular products. The overall distribution of impacts is not
regressive, showing positive impacts in the three lowest deciles and increasing negative
impacts from the fourth decile upward. However, the relationship between frauds and
income distribution is not linear, with the top decile of households showing a negligible
negative effect. It is difficult to venture possible explanations for this pattern. In a
SAM model the distribution of impacts on household incomes basically depends on
the distribution of value added to production factor and on the structure of earnings of
each family group.19 Overall, due to the difference in income levels between the two
odds of distribution, the impact on inequality is likely to be small.
7 Conclusion
The contribution of this study to the scanty literature on the assessment of the economic
impact of food frauds is twofold. From the methodological viewpoint, this paper
proposes an approach to assess economy-wide impacts adopting a SAM analytical
framework. Building a suitable disaggregated SAMmakes possible to assess the share
of the economy depending on the final demand supplied by irregular activities as well
as to estimate the impact of wine fraud on the economy in a counterfactual framework.
From the empirical viewpoint, our results show that the share of the Italian economy
19 Frauds modify the distribution of incomes among production factors (employed and self-employed
labor, capital) and, as a result, affect the earnings of each family group according to the composition of
their incomes. On one hand, the fraudulent wine production activities show a larger share of value added
accruing to capital (likely to directly improve the relative position of higher deciles in income distribution).
On the other hand, the induced impact of the distribution of income of fraudulent activities through final
consumption is likely to relatively increase the demand for products produced by industries (mainly non-
agricultural sectors) distributing a higher share of value added to employed labor (so improving the position
of lower deciles in income distribution). The combined effect via direct, indirect and induced impacts results
in the observed structure of impacts on households’ incomes.
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that depends on the final demand for wine supplied by fraudulent production activities
is not trivial. Wine frauds generate 0.5% of total employment and account for 0.31%
of total output of the Italian economy. These estimates are much larger when looking
at impact on the agri-food system: up to 11.5% of the output of specialized permanent
crop farms and up to 25% of wine industry output may directly and/or indirectly
depend on the final demand for irregular product.
We can interpret the heavy dependence of wine demand on irregular productions
as a measure of the vulnerability of this sector to demand disruption should a scan-
dal happen. This is of paramount importance for the Italian wine value chain where
quality differentiation through immaterial attributes, primarily geographical origin, is
the cornerstone of its competitive advantages in the markets. Paradoxically, it is the
attempt to vertically differentiate wines that makes this value chain more vulnerable
to the risk of fraud as fraudsters can exploit the complexity of implemented quality
assurance systems. A direct policy implication would be simplifying administrative
procedures required for quality differentiation and designing more effective and effi-
cient controls as key components a food safety and quality assurance system.However,
this might not be an easy task because, as shown by Anania and Nisticò (2004), the
political economy of regulations for credence goods allows for a converging interest
by the producers of high-quality goods and producers of low-quality goods in pro-
ducing a political compromise that results in a regulation of little credibility and low
effectiveness.20
The SAM-based counterfactual analysis of the impact of wine frauds on the Italian
economy shows that the loss of total output can be as high as 406 million euro per year
(2009 value) considering the total value of irregular products. Significantly, the results
show a slightly positive increase of value added along with a contraction of the activity
level (losses in output and employment). We interpret such a result as the presence of
fraud rents: the extra-profits from frauds do not activate the national economy as they
partially leak out towards exogenous accounts such as the public administration and
the rest of the world. In terms of employment, frauds in the value chain imply a loss
of more 6.8 thousand labor units, mostly in the agriculture sector. Interestingly, the
employment loss in the agri-food systems is larger than the employment loss in the
whole economy. This implies that the net effect on employment in non-agricultural
production sectors is positive, as it is specifically the case for legal and administrative
services. This is an evidence that frauds other thanwine sophistication aremostly paper
frauds, due to non-compliance with production codes, incorrect DOP/IGP labeling,
incorrect administrative rules on process documentation and quality certification, etc.
We argue this as a further element supporting the rent-seeking nature of most wine
frauds.
The overall conclusion emerging from the counterfactual analysis is that frauds in
the wine value chain are not only a source of unfair competition to regular produc-
tion activities, but also have an overall contractionary impact on the whole economy
due to their character of directly unproductive rent-seeking activities (Krueger 1974;
Bhagwati 1982). The policy implication is that more effective tools to combat food
20 The theoretical results by Anania and Nisticò (2004) could help in explaining the low effectiveness of
existing regulations in the case of geographical indications.
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frauds are not only measures to increase the wine sector competitiveness in the global
markets, but they are also effective pro-growth policies that are likely to determine
positive impacts on employment in the short-run.
The value chain analysis shows thatmost irregularities (95%) aremade by only three
agents, i.e. individual wineries, bottlers-wholesalers and retailers, who also account
for almost all seizure value (99%). Significantly, cooperative wineries are much less
affected by frauds. The striking difference between individual and cooperative winer-
ies may depend on lower fraud opportunities of the latter as compared to the former
or to higher responsiveness to fines and loss of reputation of larger companies. This
evidence resonates Parker’s (2006) argument about a more difficult compliance in
small production units because of a combination of limited liability21 and lower prob-
ability of being detected by control agencies, leading to a “deterrence trap”. In order
to improve monitoring efficiency, ICQRF may consider to pay more attention to indi-
vidual wineries, especially those integrating different stages such as wine processing,
bottling and distribution. In fact, production units involving several stages of produc-
tion have a higher payoff in not-complying because the more complex the production
process the more difficult to be detected, while expected gain from fraud increases
since integrating various stages of production the value addition increases.
This study proves that making an overall assessment of the economic impact of
frauds in a given value chain can be carried in a counterfactual framework using
an appropriately disaggregated SAM. However, the accuracy of the estimates has
been limited by the lack of data on counterfeiting of Italian wine abroad (i.e. the so-
called “Italian sounding”) and the lack of data on imported counterfeited intermediate
products. While the impact of the former is likely to be trivial for a product such as
wine, the latter could be of some importance. In both cases, however, should data
on these illegal activities be available they could be easily included in the proposed
framework through a change in the vector of the exogenous injections.
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